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Rizzi (1989), developing a proposal first made in Rizzi (1988) and incorporat-
ing an important modification from Cinque (1989) (see also Aoun (1986) for a
related discussion), argues that whether wh-expressions can undergo so-called
“long” movement depends on whether they are referential or function only as
operators. He claims that non-referential wh-phrases lack a referential index
and so leave unindexed traces when they move. These unindexed traces, to
be linked to the moved phrase associated with them, must be governed by a
local antecedent. The indexed traces left by the movement of a referential wh-
phrase, on the other hand, do not require antecedent government because they
are bound by (coindexed with) their antecedent. The difference between the
two classes of phrase is predicted to show up in movement out of wh-islands
(“long movement”). Since the filled intermediate COMP in these cases blocks
antecedent government, the movement of non-referential wh-phrases should
be impossible. Movement of referentialwh-phrases, on the other hand, should
be relatively acceptable, though degraded slightly by the subjacency effect.
The distinction between referential and non-referential wh-phrases over-
laps the complement/adjunct distinction and is meant to supersede it (see Ep-
stein (1987) for another attempt to reduce the complement/adjunct distinction
to indexing differences). Thus, the well-known asymmetry between cases like
(1) and (2) is to be a consequence, not of the fact that adjuncts are not theta
governed (see Chomsky 1986), but rather of the fact that they are not referen-
tial:
This paper is a substantially revised version of one presented to the Conference on
Cross-Linguistic Quantification held in July 1989 as part of the Linguistic Society of
American Summer Institute at the University of Arizona. In writing it, I have benefited
from discussions with a number of people, including Sylvain Bromberger, Sam Epstein,
Nomi Erteshik, Jack Hoeksema, Tina Kraskow, Elaine McNulty, Beatrice Santorini,
and Raffaella Zanuttini.
Note from the Editors: This paper was written in 1989 but not published until now. We
include it here in order to make this widely cited work more easily available. It has not
been updated and so lacks all reference to recent work on the topic.
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(1) Which problem were you wondering whether to tackle?
(2) *How were you wondering which problem to tackle?
Rizzi’s motivation for stating the constraint on long movement in terms of ref-
erentiality instead of theta government is that some verbal complements that
are clearly theta governed nonetheless resist long movement. These comple-
ments are of two types: idiomatic and amount quantified objects. The id-
iomatic cases, however, are problematic for a number of reasons,1 leaving the
amount quantified objects as the clearest instances of the phenomenon Rizzi
describes. The resistance of wh-amount quantifiers to long movement from
theta-governed positions is shown by the contrast between (3) or (4) and (5):2
(3) a. How much did the book cost?
b. How much did Bill pay for the book?
(4) a. How much did Bill say that the book cost?
b. How much did Bill decide to pay for the book?
(5) a. *How much did Bill wonder whether the book cost?
b. *How much did Bill wonder whether to pay for the book?
In all of these sentences the phrase how much is the complement of a verb. In
the (a) sentences it is a measure phrase complement and in the (b) sentences
it is a simple direct object. Nonetheless, the long movement in (5) is unac-
ceptable. Since government and theta role assignment obtain here, it seems
reasonable to suppose that the nature of the moved wh-phrase is responsible
for the deviance in (5). What is wrong, according to Rizzi, is that the wh-
amount quantifier is not referential.
This approach to understanding the ill-formedness of (5) seems promis-
ing to us, and in the discussion that follows we will try to understand better in
what the referentiality requirement might consist. Our investigation, however,
will lead to conclusions somewhat different from Rizzi’s. In the first place,
it is easy to show, as Rizzi himself recognizes, that a simple referentiality re-
quirement will not account for the general failure of adjuncts to extract by long
movement. Therefore, at least at our current level of understanding of the phe-
nomena, we must continue to block the extraction of adjuncts per se. Secondly,
we can show that the referentiality requirement is a semantic and pragmatic
1These reasons include the fact that it is unclear whether idiomatic objects are theta
governed and the fact that even short movement of idiomatic objects is often unaccept-
able. For these reasons we have chosen to limit our discussion to the amount quantifier
case, where the facts and their interpretation seem clearer.
2Rizzi’s discussion is based on Italian examples, but the facts in English seem to be
exactly parallel.
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one; therefore, it need not and should not be invoked to constrain extraction
syntactically. Rather, certain questions, in particular cases like (5), are unac-
ceptable because their presuppositions are highly implausible. As expected,
when contexts are constructed in which the plausibility of these presupposi-
tions is increased, the questions become acceptable. If this view of the ref-
erentiality requirement is correct, then the extraction of complements remains
syntactically free, as has been generally assumed. Here again, it seems that the
referentiality effects described by Rizzi do not provide grounds for ceasing to
take the complement/adjunct asymmetry as fundamental to the syntax of wh-
extraction. Such a conclusion would only be warranted, in our view, if it were
possible to show that all constraints on adjunct extraction were explicable in
semantic and pragmatic terms. This possibility is worth further investigation,
but it is far from certain to be correct.3 In any case, such a conclusion would
be just the reverse of the one reached by Rizzi, whose analysis constrains ex-
traction more tightly in the syntax than previous work, since it rules out not
only adjunct extractions but also some extractions of complements.
2. The Nature of Referentiality
In defining a notion of referentiality relevant to his concerns, Rizzi appeals
to the discussion in Cinque (1989). The latter proposes that referential wh-
phrases are those which are d(iscourse)-linked, in the sense of Pesetsky (1987).
Under Cinque’s interpretation, d-linked wh-phrases refer to members of a set
that has been evoked in the discourse (see Prince 1981), while non-d-linked
wh-phrases, being operators, make no such reference. Since amount quanti-
fiers like how much will rarely or never be d-linked, they will not be referen-
tial and will not license long movement. Amount quantifiers pattern with bare
wh words, which are ordinarily non d-linked, while expressions of the form
3One piece of evidence that supports the removal of the complement/adjunct asym-
metry from the syntax is the following contrast:
(i) a. *How quickly were you wondering whether anybody could run?
b. *Quickly, I wonder whether anybody could run.
(ii) That quickly, I wonder whether anybody could run.
In (ii) the topicalized element is clearly referential and the contrast with (ib) gives evi-
dence that this referentiality is responsible for the acceptability of the long movement.
This pattern does not extend to at least some other adjuncts (see 8 below); and unless
these cases can be given a semantic analysis, the complement/adjunct distinction will
not be dispensible.
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which+N are d-linked. Thus, consider (6) below:
(6) A man walks into an apartment building in front of two women who are
conversing on the sidewalk. One says to the other: “Who/Which man
just went into the building?”
If the speaker in (6) uses who, she indicates no expectation as to the identity of
the person who entered the building. If, on the other hand, the speaker uses the
phrase which man, she is assuming not only that the person is a man but also
that he belongs to some contextually defined set salient in her interlocutor’s
consciousness. Therefore, in the second case, the NP expected as an answer
to the question refers to an (as yet) unidentified member of that set. By taking
d-linking to be equivalent to referentiality, Cinque obtains an explanation for
contrasts like that between (7a) and (7b) below:
(7) a. ??What were you wondering how to fix e?
b. Which car were you wondering how to fix e?
Example (7a) sounds odd because what is ordinarily non-d-linked and so non-
referential. It lacks a referential index and, when it moves, leaves behind an
unindexed trace. This trace, therefore, must be licensed (i.e., identified) by
antecedent government; but the needed trace in COMP is absent since its po-
sition is filled by how. (If, following Chomsky 1986, we assume movement
via adjunction to VP, then the VP-adjoined trace is the offending one.) In
(7b), the wh-phrase which car is d-linked and referential so that the movedwh
and its trace are coindexed. This coindexing serves to identify the trace, mak-
ing antecedent government unnecessary. This example illustrates why Rizzi
(1989) adopts Cinque’s definition of referentiality in preference to his own
1988 definition, which does not account for the contrast in (7). The earlier
paper distinguishes referential from non-referential NP’s by their theta role,
stipulating that all and only NP’s receiving the theta roles of participants in
the event-type denoted by a verb count as referential. Under this definition the
extracted element is equally referential in both of the sentences of (7); and so
both extractions should be acceptable, aside from the subjacency effect, which
must be abstracted away from in comparing long movement cases.
Cinque’s concept of referentiality is certainly more plausible than Rizzi’s
original one. It seems based on a real semantic property of noun phrases with
observable effects on meaning and discourse structure, while Rizzi’s notion
does not have any obvious linguistic reality other than its role in constrain-
ing extraction. Unfortunately, as Rizzi points out, Cinque’s notion does not
account for the whole range of complement/adjunct extraction asymmetries.
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Consider, for example, the contrast in (8) [our English equivalent of example
(36) in Rizzi (1989)]:4
(8) a. *For which reason don’t you know if we can say [that Gianni was
fired e]?
b. Which reason don’t you know if we can give e for Gianni’s firing?
The questioned elements in these two sentences are equally referential yet
there is a sharp contrast in their acceptability. The fact is that reason adverbs
can never be extracted from wh-islands; and this phenomenon is not obviously
a result of their referential status. To account for this case Rizzi proposes to
keep his referential theta role requirement on extraction as a supplement to
Cinque’s referentiality requirement. But since Cinque’s requirement covers
all variation in the acceptability of long movement out of argument positions,
the only effect of Rizzi’s theta role requirement is to capture argument/adjunct
asymmetries like (8). In other words, the contrast in (8) shows that an ar-
gument/adjunct asymmetry in long movement remains, which is not due to
referentiality effects. As we mentioned earlier, this remaining asymmetry may
have another semantic or pragmatic explanation or it may be syntactic, as up to
now it has seemed to be. In either case, the use of a referentiality requirement
to constrain long movement does not allow one to dispense with the distinction
between complements and adjuncts.
In associating referentiality with d-linking, Cinque raises for us, though
he does not himself discuss it, the question of exactly what semantic property
is controlling acceptability differences like those in (7). According to Pesetsky,
a d-linked wh-phrase is one whose use in a question limits the range of felici-
tous answers to the members of a contextually defined set; and it is reasonable
to suppose that non-d-linked expressions make no reference to contextually
defined sets. However, it is not obvious that non-d-linked expressions are in
any semantic or pragmatic sense “non-referential”. Their use does constrain
answers to membership in fixed sets. The sets are only rigidly (i.e., semanti-
cally), and very broadly, rather than contextually, and more narrowly, defined.
4The obvious hypothesis that the contrast in (8) is due to the fronting of a PP versus
an NP is incorrect. Compare the sentences below:
(i) a. Which child were you wondering whether to give books to?
b. To which child were you wondering whether to give books?
Here there is a slight asymmetry, probably due to the fact that preposition stranding
is generally more natural than pied-piping in English. The difference, however, is not
comparable to the sharp contrast in (8).
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Thus, in (9a) below, expected answers are constrained to belong to the set of
human beings while in (9b) the answer is expected to be a non-human entity:
(9) a. Who fell?
b. What fell?
In the end, we will argue that wh-expressions in matrix questions5 are always
“referential” in some sense and that Cinque’s non-referential examples have
another analysis than the one he proposes. Nonetheless, the dichotomy he
sets up is revealing and we will continue to use the terms “referential” and
“non-referential” as convenient labels for the two cases Cinque has isolated.
3. Amount Quantifier Movement Out ofWh-Islands
Cinque notes in passing that amount quantifier wh-expressions are ambigu-
ous and that this ambiguity affects whether they can undergo long movement.
Given his perspective, he assumes that the two interpretations of these expres-
sions differ simply in referentiality. The ambiguity is worth further examina-
tion, however, which will reveal semantic complexities that Cinque does not
discuss. Consider the following case:
(10) How many books did the editor publish this year?
This example looks superficially like (3), but the relative acceptability of the
long movement in (11) as compared to (5) shows that there is an important
difference:
(11) a. How many books did Bill wonder whether the editor would publish
this year?
b. How many books did the editor wonder whether to publish this year?
The sentences of (11) are acceptable and the questioned amount quantifier
phrase does seem to refer to a set of books. This becomes clear if we compare
(11) to (12):
(12) a. How many books did Bill say that the editor would publish this year?
b. How many books did the editor decide to publish this year?
The sentences in (12) are ambiguous as to the apparent scope of the amount
quantifier in a way that those in (11) are not; and the missing readings in (11),
5We are limiting our attention here to non-multiple wh-questions.
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as expected, are the ones where the amount quantifiedwh-phrase is being taken
non-referentially.6
If the contrast between (11) and (12) is due to a difference in the referen-
tiality of the wh-phrase, then we can expect to understand better the character
of this difference by closer semantic and pragmatic analysis. In particular,
we might consider the relationship between wh-phrase referentiality and the
existential presuppositions of questions (see Comorovski 1988). Every wh-




This presupposition does not in any direct way constrain possible answers to
the question; for example, it is perfectly possible in this case to answer “No
one.” Rather the presupposition is a requirement on the “askability” of a ques-
tion. The speaker, in asking the question, must presuppose the corresponding
existential sentence. Although the presupposition can seemingly be canceled,
as in (15), the cancellation is only apparent.
(15) Who left, if anyone.
In such cases, a speaker is taken to be asking a question only when the if-
clause condition is satisfied.7 Thus, (15) as a whole does not presuppose that
someone left; but it is a question only if the existential presupposition holds.
One property of the existential presuppositions of questions is that they
introduce discourse referents just in the way that declarative sentences with
wide scope existentially quantified NP’s do. Thus, to (13) the speaker can add
(16):
(16) Whoever he is better have had a good reason.
The definite pronoun he in (16) refers to a uniquely identifiable discourse en-
tity in the same way when used after (13) as when used after a simple existen-
tial sentence, say (14). Thus, even in the absence of an answer to the question
that identifies a leaver, the speaker of (13) (or his/her interlocutor) has intro-
duced a discourse entity. Furthermore, in the subsequent discourse that entity
6Under Cinque’s analysis this pattern is expected but not under Rizzi’s original
treatment. Obviously, the theta role of the moved wh-phrase does not vary between
(11) and (12).
7This semantic point is mirrored in the intonation of our example. The question
intonation occurs over the phrase who left with the conditional receiving declarative
intonation.
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is uniquely identifiable (within the given context, of course; see Hawkins 1978,
Prince 1981 for analyses of this identifiability) since it can be referred to by
a definite pronoun. Since the uttering of (13) gives no information about the
new discourse entity except that it has the property of having left, we must say
that this property is sufficient by itself to identify the entity uniquely in the
context in which the question is used. This point will become crucial in the
discussion to follow.
Consider the existential presuppositions of amount quantified questions.
The sentence in (17) gives informally the presupposition of the non-referential
(3a) and the sentences in (18) give the presuppositions of (10) on its non-
referential and referential readings, respectively:8
(17) There is an amount of money such that the book cost that amount.
(18) a. There is an amount of books such that the editor published that
amount this year.
b. There is a set of books such that the editor published that set this year.
Given these presuppositions, the questions ask for an identification of the mea-
sure of the entities introduced by the existential quantification. The measure
of a set of countable objects is, of course, its cardinality; and the measure of a
mass entity is an amount, expressed in units appropriate for measuring that sort
of entity. Acceptable instances of long-moved amount quantifiers have pre-
suppositions parallel to (18b). Thus, in (19a) we have a sentence structurally
parallel to the acceptable (11) and (19b) gives its existential presupposition:
(19) a. How many books did Bill ask whether the company was interested
in publishing?
b. There was a set of books for which Bill asked whether the company
was interested in publishing them.
If we construct the existential presupposition for a long moved non-referential
amount quantifier, as in (20a), in the same way as for the above examples, we
obtain something like (20b):
(20) a. *How much money was John wondering whether to pay?
b. There was a sum of money about which John was wondering
whether to pay it.
This presupposition is semantically well-formed but odd; that is, the sentence
is unusable under most discourse circumstances, which suggests that (20a) is
8We are treating the two meanings of amount quantifiers over countable sets as
though they were unrelated. This seems unlikely; but further work would be needed to
determine whether one can be derived from the other.
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perhaps not ungrammatical but merely unusable in most contexts. The odd-
ness of the presupposition lies in its stating that there could be a specific sum
of money, say twenty dollars, that could be uniquely identified in the discourse
by having the property that John was wondering whether to pay it. Of course,
John might plausibly wonder howmuch to pay, but then there is no unique sum
with the property that he is wondering whether to pay it. As one might expect,
under carefully chosen circumstances, the equivalent of (20b) can be made
more plausible as a presupposition and then the equivalent of (20a) seems ac-
ceptable. Consider (21a) below with the presupposition in (21b) in the context
of a sports tournament of some type:
(21) a. How many points are the judges arguing about whether to deduct?
b. There is a number of points about which the judges were arguing
whether to deduct that number.
This question can be asked of one spectator by another under certain narrowly
constrained circumstances. Suppose that the rules of the sport specify fixed
point deductions for various infractions and that the judges are arguing about
whether to call an infraction from a class requiring the deduction of a certain
number of points. They have decided what class of infraction is involved but
not whether actually to deduct the points. Then, if a spectator is interested
only in the number of points to be deducted and not in the nature of the infrac-
tion, he/she might ask the question in (21a). If our judgment is correct here,
then it follows that the unacceptability of long-movement of “non-referential”
amount quantifiers is due, not to any semantic non-referentiality but rather to
their quantifying over (hence, referring to) amounts rather than more usual
sorts of entities.
In our sports example, the different numbers of points that can be de-
ducted make up a situationally evoked (see again Prince 1981) set to which the
questioned wh-phrase in (21a) is d-linked. Contexts which link wh-phrases to
evoked sets favor long movement because they make the presupposition that
there is a unique entity of the appropriate type more plausible by supplying a
specific set of candidate entities that might satisfy the presupposition. But d-
linking is not an absolute requirement for long movement and does not directly
constrain it.9 Thus, examples like the following seem relatively acceptable
even in non-d-linked contexts:
(22) a. Who were you wondering whether to visit on your vacation?
9Here we differ from Comorovski (1988), who gives a semantic account of ex-
tractability from wh- islands otherwise similar to our own. See also Groenendijk and
Stokhof (1982).
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b. What were you wondering whether to make for dinner?
On the other hand, d-linking also facilitates the asking of syntactically simple
questions where movement constraints are not at issue, as the contrast between
(23) and (24) shows:
(23) ? Where did you change jobs the most?
(24) In which city did you change jobs the most?
Here in (23) it is not clear what sorts of locations are possible answers so the
question is a bit hard to interpret. In (24) the phrase in which city links up to a
context in which the locations that would serve as answers have already been
evoked and so the question is more felicitous.
To summarize our discussion to this point, we have presented evidence
that the problem with long-movement in “non-referential” amount questions
is not that the amount quantifier is non-referential but rather that it refers to an
amount.10 In such cases, a general requirement on wh-questions is usually not
met; namely, that their existential presupposition introduce an entity uniquely
identifiable in the discourse context is. Thus, a sentence like (5a), repeated
here as (25a), has the presupposition in (25b):
(25) a. *How much did Bill wonder whether the book cost?
b. There is a sum such that Bill wondered whether the book cost that
sum.
In other words, (25a) is synonymous with the following question:
(26) For what specific sum of money did Bill wonder whether the book cost
that sum?
This paraphrase, though perfectly grammatical and not involving long move-
ment, is pragmatically odd in the same obvious way that an answer to that
question is odd:
(27) Bill wondered about the amount ten dollars whether the book cost that.
10Certainly, amounts can be referential entities, as in the following sentence:
(i) The amount that I paid for the book was enough to cover two meals in a good
restaurant.
It is not clear how the existence of sentences like (i) could be made compatible with
the Rizzi/Cinque claim that amount quantifiers are not ordinarily referential.
LONG WH-MOVEMENT 31
Normally, one doesn’t wonder about specific amounts whether some property
holds of them and this fact is sufficient to account for the oddness of (25)-(27),
independently of whether the examples exhibit wh-movement, strengthening
our claim that the problem with such cases is pragmatic and semantic and that
long movement of amount quantifier wh-phrases from complement position is
not restricted in the syntax.
4. Additional Evidence
Considerable additional evidence can be adduced for the analysis presented
above. The following sections discuss some of this evidence, drawing on the
behavior of echo questions, the negative island effect, and scope reconstruc-
tion.
4.1. Echo Questions
With appropriate intonation, sentences containing questioned constituents can
be taken as requests for information which the asker presumes to have just
been introduced into a discourse but which he/she has missed. Such echo
questions ordinarily use the same syntactic form as the declarative sentence
that introduced the misunderstood information. In fact, they are frequently
asked with the wh in situ, as in (28) below:
(28) The book cost how much?
However, it also possible, if the special intonation is retained, for the wh ele-
ment to appear in its ordinary fronted position, as in (29):
(29) How much did the book cost?
In an echo question, the existence of a specific and unique discourse entity that
satisfies the question’s existential presupposition is always guaranteed since
the question is parasitic on the preceding declarative. Therefore, one expects,
in light of our discussion, that long-movement of amount quantifiers should
occur freely in echo questions. The example below indicates that it does (see
the discussion in Comorovski 1988):11
(30) A: We asked whether the book cost ten dollars.
B: a. You asked whether the book cost how much?
OR b. How much did you ask whether the book cost?
11Thanks to Beatrice Santorini for drawing our attention to the echo question inter-
pretation in long movement cases.
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Of course, the circumstances under which A would utter the sentence given
are quite limited since the question, “Did the book cost ten dollars?” can itself
only be asked felicitously if the speaker has reason to think that ten dollars is
somehow a specially appropriate price to ask about; for example, because there
are reasons to think it the most likely price. However, given A’s utterance, B
can always ask the echo question (a) to confirm what A said; and whenever (a)
is possible, so is (b).
4.2. Negative Islands
An important motivation for introducing considerations of referentiality into
the description of wh-movement are the facts of extraction from so-called
“negative islands” (Ross 1984). As Rizzi points out, these facts parallel those
of long movement out of indirect questions. Thus, the negated counterparts of
questions like (31), given in (32), are unacceptable:
(31) a. How much did it cost?
b. How much did you pay?
(32) a. *How much didn’t it cost?
b. *How much didn’t you pay?
Rizzi argues that this contrast arises because negation projects an additional
phrasal boundary, NegP, which blocks antecedent government. However, this
simple configurational account runs into difficulty with examples like (33):
(33) a. How much/little did you manage to pay?
b. *How much/little did you fail to pay?
Here we see that the inherently negative verb fail blocks movement just as
an overt negative does, in contrast to the non-negative verb manage. In a
footnote Rizzi suggests that the negative verb may raise at LF to a position that
blocks antecedent government, presumably NegP, but he doesn’t investigate
this possibility in any detail. The plausibility of this approach is limited, given
that it would seem to make a wrong prediction as to the scope of negation in
sentences with the verb fail as opposed to those with overt sentence negation.
Consider, for example, the following pairs:
(34) a. He has not always managed to pay his bills.
b. He has always failed to pay his bills.
(35) a. Everyone has not managed to pay his bills.
b. Everyone has failed to pay his bills.
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In both of these cases the negation associated with fail has narrow scope with
respect to the quantifier in the sentence while the sentence negative not has,
obligatorily in (34) and optionally in (35), wide scope over the quantifier. If LF
is the input to quantifier interpretation, then fail cannot raise at LF. However,
fail does contain a negative operator able to take wide scope over a quantifier.
When fail c-commands the quantifier from its s-structure (i.e., non-raised) po-
sition, its negation may take wide scope. Thus, the following pair of sentences
are both ambiguous and the contrast between verbal and sentential negation
found above having disappeared:
(36) a. He has not managed to pay all of his bills.
b. He has failed to pay all of his bills
Aside from the difficulty for the Rizzi/Cinque analysis posed by inherently
negative verbs, there is also a problem posed by negative quantifiers. Thus,
the unacceptable sentences in (32) are matched by sentence like those in (37)
below, in which negatively quantified NP’s provide the negative force:12
(37) a. *How much do no books cost?
b. *How much did none of you pay?
In these sentences, there would seem to be noNegP to create the barrier needed
by Rizzi’s account, unless somehow a negative lowering operation can be mo-
tivated at LF, an implausible option at present.
The difficulties with a syntactic account of the “negative island” effects
suggest an attempt to unify them under our semantic analysis of constraints
on long movement of amount quantifiers. Indeed, just as we might expect
under a semantic account we find that it is possible to construct contexts where
extraction from negative is allowed. Consider (38):
(38) How much didn’t you pay that you were supposed to?
Here the extraposed relative clause modifying how much serves to introduce a
unique amount into the existential presupposition of the question, which might
be stated as in (39):
(39) There was a sum that you were supposed to pay that you didn’t pay.
Since this presupposition is plausible, the question is acceptable. Another ex-
ample that makes the same point is the discourse in (40), where the extraction
sounds perfectly fine in the ironic context:13
12There is, of course, a secondary reading of these sentences with a constituent nega-
tion interpretation. On this reading the sentences are acceptable but then not relevant
to the negative island effect.
13Thanks to Jack Hoeksema for this example.
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(40) A:How much have beans been costing lately?
B:The price has been jumping around so much, you’d do better to ask:
How much haven’t they cost?
From such examples and others easily constructed, we may conclude that the
same semantic account based on the plausibility of presuppositions covers ex-
traction out of both wh-islands and negative contexts. Thus, further investi-
gation supports the generalization across these two cases proposed by Rizzi,
although not his specific analysis.
4.3. Scope Reconstruction
One piece of evidence adduced by Cinque in support of his use of referentiality
to constrain long movement is a restriction on scope interpretation observed
in Longobardi (1987). Longobardi notes a difference in the scope of the wh
operator and the universal quantifier in sentences like the following pair:14
(41) How many patients do you think that every doctor in the hospital can
visit in an hour?
(42) ? How many patients did you wonder whether every doctor in the
hospital could visit in an hour?
Example (42) is odd because of the long moved amount quantifier but it can
only be interpreted with every having narrow scope with respect to how many.
Example (41), on the other hand, is ambiguous as to the scope of every and
how many. Following Longobardi, Cinque attributes the ambiguity of (41) to
the optional reconstruction of the moved wh-phrase back to its deep structure
position. To explain the absence of ambiguity in (42), Longobardi points to
the lack of an intermediate trace in the COMP of its embedded clause and ar-
gues that scope reconstruction requires a chain of local (antecedent governed)
traces. Cinque rejects this account because other reconstruction effects, those
involving pronoun binding, do not require such a chain. Thus, the sentences in
(43) [Cinque’s (29)] show that a wh-island does not block reconstruction with
respect to the application of principles A, B, or C of the binding theory:
14Longobardi’s examples are in Italian; but the facts of English correspond reason-
ably closely to the Italian ones so that we will base our discussion on English examples.
There is a difference between the languages that we will ignore in our discussion but
that merits further investigation. The English example (41) is ambiguous and at least
some speakers prefer the reading under which every doctor in the hospital has narrow
scope with respect to how many patients. The Italian example apparently has as its
preferred reading the one with wide scope for the universally quantified NP.
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(43) a. It’s of herself that I don’t know whether she thinks.
b. *It’s of her(i) that I don’t know whether Mary(i) thinks.
c. *It’s of Mary(i) that I don’t know whether she(i) thinks.
Given this pattern, Cinque proposes that the failure of reconstruction in (42) is
due to the fact that how many patients is necessarily referential, having been
long-moved out of a wh-island, and being referential, cannot occur inside the
scope of a quantifier.
There are two considerations which militate against Cinque’s analysis
here. First of all, it is not true that long-movedwh-phrases cannot interact with
quantifiers. Cinque apparently expects a lack of interaction because referential
noun phrases (definite noun phrases and specific indefinites) ordinarily do not
interact with quantifiers. On our analysis every wh-question phrase is asso-
ciated with an existential quantifier and so has the potential to exhibit scope
ambiguity. Such ambiguity is quite clearly possible; consider, for instance, the
following case:
(44) a. The boss wants to know which projects every other firm still has not
decided whether to bid on.
b. The boss wants lists of which projects every other firm still has not
decided whether to bid on.
These sentences are ambiguous as to the relative scope of which projects and
every other firm; indeed, the reading on which every other firm has wide scope
seems the preferred one. However, on Cinque’s analysis this reading should be
impossible since which project has been long-moved and is referential. Either
referentiality does not block interaction with quantifiers, in which case Longo-
bardi’s scope reconstruction effect is not explained, or, contra Cinque’s central
proposal, it is not a condition on long movement. Secondly, there seems to be
less reason than Cinque indicates to expect scope reconstruction to patternwith
reconstruction effects involving pronominal binding. The latter, at least in the
core cases Cinque considers, seem to involve only the syntactic configurations
under which coindexing is checked and not to involve semantic interpretation
in any deep way. The former, on the other hand, occurs only in semantically
intensional contexts, interacts with quantifier raising, and depends for its anal-
ysis on exactly how one interprets the quantificational character of questioned
constituents. An exploration of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this
paper; but in the absence of a precise proposal regarding the semantics of
scope reconstruction, there is little reason for surprise its not falling together
with the binding cases.
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